Chinese Cars as Military Threats? It’s Not Science Fiction
Glenn Chafetz, Director of 2430 Group, writes in The Cipher Brief about concerns over Chinese-manufactured vehicles and their software as national security threats, highlighting potential military applications of Chinese networked vehicles and Low Earth Orbit satellites.
This article was first published in The Cipher Brief in September 2024.
When President Biden first sounded the alarm in February about importing Chinese vehicles and their software, most attention focused on how Beijing could use that software to gather information on Americans and on U.S. infrastructure. Yet grasping the full threat means contemplating scenarios that may sound like science fiction.
Today’s vehicles already collect personal data and transmit it to manufacturers via always-on cellular and satellite connections; and car manufacturers are working feverishly to automate every function of their vehicles. Gaming out what Chinese-manufactured cars can do on U.S. soil—for a government that makes no distinction between economic, political, and military spheres—is not an exercise in fantasy but an urgent national security task.
The technology in today’s most advanced networked vehicles can already be used for communication, guidance, jamming, and ground transport disruption, especially when combined with Low Earth Orbit satellites (LEOs) and ground networks. If a fleet of these “smart” vehicles were on the ground in another country, then China – as the manufacturer of those vehicles – might be able to use their data for military purposes.
Again, it sounds like science fiction. But here are some of the potential military applications:
Guidance of hypersonic, cruise, or glide missiles that fly at or faster than five times the speed of sound. In 2021, China tested a hypersonic missile that reportedly circled the globe before hitting a test target in China. A problem with missiles that fast is effective communication; but a system like the one described above could use networked vehicles as mobile relays between the missiles and the signal origin, allowing for higher data speeds and lower latency. LEOs, especially in combination with internet-of-things (IoT)-connected vehicles and the 5G network, would in theory increase the speed and reduce the latency of the required guidance communication.
Use of LEOs to jam U.S. radars. Chinese researchers claim that they have modeled a successful test of this application, using 28 LEOs against a U.S. aircraft carrier. A vehicle connected via an LEO is much more responsive and accurate when it comes to guidance.
Remote-controlled access to vehicles. Imagine an adversary remotely directing hundreds of thousands of vehicles on U.S. soil as explosive or inert projectiles – or using them to block or deny an adversary’s ability to use roads and railways worldwide. If this degree of remote control seems far-fetched, consider that Ford has developed a system to remotely repossess its vehicles. Moreover, both the Russians and Ukrainians have used ground-based autonomous and remote-controlled vehicles for minesweeping, reconnaissance, and directly as weapons. While the U.S. Army does invest in research and development of both autonomous vehicles and integrated space systems for ground combat, it does not appear to have investigated the applications of existing commercial systems by China or any other adversary.
A Chinese company to watch
One Chinese company, Zhejiang Geely Holding Group (Geely), is a conglomerate that combines all the necessary technologies for these purposes: autonomous vehicle production, LEO manufacture and operations, and access to terrestrial communication infrastructure. Geely not only makes EVs, but also owns a subsidiary, Geespace, that develops, launches, and operates LEO satellites. Geely also happens to partner with Huawei and Ericsson, which together offer nearly global 5G coverage, thus completing for Geely the trifecta required for a worldwide, high-precision command-and-control network.
Geely is just one of many Chinese companies with these capabilities. China is the world’s largest automobile exporter, and it has every other Chinese automobile (as well as space and infrastructure) company in the country at its disposal. Meanwhile, China uses every means possible to infiltrate U.S. critical infrastructure, and it would be naïve to think that it would abjure the advantages networked vehicles provide.
How to respond
What then to do? The U.S. and its allies have already imposed steep tariffs, but tariffs and investigations will not suffice. The U.S. should at a minimum do the following:
Ban the import of Chinese automobiles or their components into the U.S. and allied countries.
Cut off access of Chinese auto manufacturers to U.S. and allied suppliers.
Prohibit the use of U.S.-origin components for use in Chinese-manufactured automobiles.
Prevent China from setting the standards for the relevant technologies, including vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications.
Support U.S. and allied LEO competitors in denying the PRC access to the orbital and communications spectrum.
Continue to decouple from Chinese-controlled infrastructure companies such as Huawei.
Persuade allies and third countries to adopt these measures as well.
U.S. and allied leaders labored for more than 40 years under the delusion that China’s technological development was for purely commercial, peaceful purposes. However, China’s own military strategists have made clear they do not recognize any technology or activity as purely commercial; commerce is woven into China’s military doctrine. The key points of that doctrine are that China is in a state of war; the U.S. is the enemy; and China is using every possible means to weaken the U.S. until the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) no longer regards the United States as a threat.
